This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies. While retail investors are typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived in academic literature to have limited influence on corporate dividend decisions, casual empiricism suggests the contrary. We hypothesise that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers' incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the propensity to manage for corporate reputation is positively related to the degree of retail shareholder base. We find empirical evidence of managers of Australian companies catering to the retail investors' preference for dividends when setting dividend policy, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of these retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and franking credits.
Introduction
The topic of corporate dividend policy and its determinants has been extensively discussed in modern corporate finance literature. The irrelevance of dividend policy to firm value was proposed in the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1961) where they demonstrated that in a world of perfect information, full capital mobility, no taxes and no agency costs, the dividend policy of a company should have no impact on its value. However these assumptions rarely hold true in the real world and several theories relaxing these assumptions have been put forward to explain the dividend puzzle.
The clientele effect of dividend policy recognizes that the existence of taxes and capital market imperfections such as transaction costs and differential interest rates in the real world prevents individuals from costlessly adjusting their dividend patterns to fit their preferred consumption patterns (i.e. dividend clientele) or tax positions (i.e. tax clientele). Investors are therefore attracted to different companies that supply them with their desired dividend pattern.
When the companies change their policies, investors will readjust their stock holdings accordingly. According to Modigliani and Miller (1961) , matching occurs when firms set their payout policies while investors sort based on their preferences for dividends. Empirical evidence for the clientele effect has however been mixed. For example, Jun, Gallagher and Partington (2006) examined a sample of 49 Australian institutional equity funds and found evidence of the existence of the clientele effect, with institutions generally preferring to hold stocks that pay dividends and have full tax credits. Other studies such as Pettit (1977) , Scholz (1992) , and Early research on the clientele effects has typically either made no assumptions about the direction of causality between dividend policy and investor preferences, or has assumed that investors are responding to pre-specified firm payout policies. While the empirical results are unchanged regardless of the direction of causal relationship, the implications for understanding firm policy can be very different. Indeed if clienteles affect share prices, then it can have a feedback effect on managerial decisions. Later studies have therefore focused more on exploring the clientele effects hypothesis from the perspective of firms adjusting their policies in response to the composition of their current investors. This led to a variant of the clientele effect hypothesis called the catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) which suggested that the corporate dividend policy is driven by prevailing investor demand for dividend payers. Managers hence cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers, and by not paying dividends when investors prefer nonpayers. In their study of firms in 23 countries over the period of 1996-2004, Ferrisa, Jayaramanb, and Sabherwalc (2009) found empirical evidence of catering among companies, particularly ones incorporated in common law countries including Australia.
Studies on the catering theory have traditionally focused on the influence of large shareholders on dividend policy, particularly institutional investors. There are several reasons why managers may want to cater their firms' dividend policies to maximize the interests of large shareholders. Firstly because large shareholders control a large proportion of the voting rights in a company, they help to facilitate quick and negotiated control, block sales to potential raiders (Grossman and Hart, 1980) and have more informed voting and better board communication and representation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) , thus helping to control agency problems. In addition because large players are better informed and have better ability to detect firm quality, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) have observed that good firms like to signal themselves by attracting large shareholders onto their share register. The tendency for managers to cater to large shareholders is hence empirically supported by Perez-Gonzalez (2003) who found that the tax preferences of large shareholders impacts the payout policy, with payout increasing when dividends are less tax-disadvantageous relative to capital gains for firms whose large shareholders were less affected by the tax system.
There has however been limited research exploring the role of retail minority shareholder demand in shaping firm payout policy, particularly in the market of Australia. Because retail investors are typically also minority shareholders, they are therefore perceived in most academic literature to have limited influence on corporate decisions, thus leading to little work being done in this area. Casual empiricism however suggests that in the real world, retail minority shareholder preferences can be an important determinant of corporate policy. For example, Charles Goode of major Australian financial institution ANZ Bank, noted in his 2009 Chairman's Report 2 his awareness of how "reducing dividends impacts all shareholders particularly individuals", thus highlighting his consideration of retail shareholder preferences when setting dividend policy.
This paper aims to fill part of the gap in academic research by investigating the relationship between retail minority shareholder preference and dividend policy. We theorise that when making corporate dividend policy decisions, managers of Australian companies are motivated, through the influence on corporate reputation, to cater to the retail minority investors' preference for dividends, with their incentive to cater positively related to the proportion of retail shareholder base 3 . Our pooled Tobit regression results show that the proportion of retail shareholders relative to the total number of shareholders is positively related to the dividend policy of Australian companies, and that the relation is statistically significant even when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage and signalling. We also show that the shareholding ownership is not a significant factor in the setting of dividend policy, thus highlighting that our result is not a proxy for the dividend substitution hypothesis. Our empirical results are robust to the inclusion of agency costs and franking credits considerations, and robust to the adoption of alternative definitions of the control variables. We therefore show that the proportion of retail shareholder base is an important determinant of corporate dividend policy in
Australia.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the effects of retail shareholders on corporate reputation and dividend policy, and introduces our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data sample and the methodology pursued. The empirical findings are reported in Section 4, while robustness tests are conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 3 Shareholder base is commonly defined as the number of shareholders on the share register while shareholding refers to the number of shares of the company. In this paper, the proportion of retail shareholder base refers to the number of retail shareholders relative to the total number of shareholders, while the proportion of retail shareholdings refers to the number of shares owned by retail shareholders relative to the total number of shares outstanding.
Retail Shareholders, Corporate Reputation and Dividend Policy

Australian Retail Shareholder Preference for Dividends
While Modigliani and Miller (1961) posits that shareholders should be indifferent to dividends versus capital gains, in the real world retail shareholders in Australia generally prefer to receive dividends. There are several reasons why this is so: since 1 July 1987, Australia has operated a dividend imputation system where stockholders can potentially receive a credit for the taxes paid at the corporate level on distributed profits. In essence, stockholders receive a franked dividend that comprises of a cash dividend plus an imputation tax credit. This imputation tax credit reflects the amount of corporate tax paid on the source profit from which the dividend was paid, and can be used to offset Australian personal tax obligations. As shown by Hanson and Ziegler (1990) , local residents paying taxes are the main beneficiaries of these franked dividend payments. Given retail investors are predominantly also local residents 4 , franked dividends therefore represent a tax-effective form of income for them.
In addition, retail investors also prefer to receive dividends because a portion of shareholders, particularly retirees, do rely on dividends for their income requirements. This is especially significant in Australia which has a rapidly aging population while boasting one of the 
Corporate Reputation As a Device Aligning Managerial Motivation With Retail
Minority Shareholder Preference
If company management is indeed taking into account the dividend preference of retail investors despite their minority shareholdings, then there must exist a mechanism that aligns managerial incentives with retail minority shareholder interests. This mechanism may be in the form of a strong level of corporate governance that motivates managers to protect the minority shareholder interests, or some other mechanism through which retail shareholders can exert their influence on managers despite their minority shareholdings.
We note that during Goyder's interview, he made particular reference to the "potential for a backlash from retail investors" in response to his company's change in dividend policy. This suggests that the potential for reputation damage and bad publicity created by angry retail investors may be a reason why the preferences of retail minority shareholders are taken into consideration by managers when setting dividend policy. This is understandable given the importance of corporate reputations to firm values, a conclusion widely supported in academic literature. Fombrun (1996) hence defines corporate reputation as "a set of collectively held beliefs about a company's ability and willingness to satisfy the interests of various stakeholders."
Various academic research including Hammond and Slocum (1996) , Fombrun (1996) , and Little and Little (2000) have shown that a good corporate reputation represents a company's most important intangible asset as it allows the company to attract customers to products, charge premium prices, attract high quality applicants for its workforce, and attract investors which helps to lower its cost of capital. This is particularly important in industries where shareholders are frequently also customers. Corporate reputation thus provides the incentive for managers to cater their corporate policies to retail minority shareholder preferences. The importance of corporate reputation, and therefore the propensity to cater, is observed by Chajet (1997) to be positively correlated to the number of shareholders in the company. Chajet (1997) hence commented that "the more stakeholders there are, the more people will be sensitive to the reputations of the companies in which they are investing." The implication is therefore that the higher the retail shareholder base, the greater the corporate reputation impact and hence the greater the managerial incentive to cater to the retail shareholder preference.
Hypothesis of Retail Shareholder Base, Corporate Reputation and Dividend Policy
We hypothesise in this paper that managers are motivated to cater to the dividend preferences of retail investors despite their minority shareholding because of the managers' desire to establish a good corporate reputation which is perceived to then translate into stronger profitability for their companies and higher premiums for their share prices. The higher the proportion of retail shareholder base, the more sensitive shareholders will be to the company's reputation and hence the greater the motivation for managers to cater to the preferences of these retail shareholders. Where retail minority shareholders have a strong preference for dividend payments, we should observe that the propensity to pay dividends (i.e. managerial incentive to cater to retail minority shareholders) is positively correlated to the degree of retail shareholder base (i.e. degree of influence on corporate reputation). We apply our theory to the market of Australia where the dividend imputation system, aging population and high equity participation has created a strong preference for dividend payments by retail shareholders, and derive a testable hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis: The greater the proportion of retail shareholder base, the higher the dividend payout of the company.
It is worth highlighting that in our hypothesis, corporate reputation forms the incentive for managers to cater to the dividend preferences of retail minority investors. Managers take into consideration the dividend preferences of minority shareholders because their numbers make up a large proportion of the shareholder base and hence they have greater influence on the corporate reputation. This is in contrast to the dividend substitution hypothesis by La Porta et al. (2000) where dividends act as a substitute monitoring device for minority shareholders. In that hypothesis, managers take into consideration the dividend preference of minority shareholders because they want to minimise the agency problems associated with minority shareholdings. The difference is therefore that in our hypothesis, it is the proportion of retail shareholder base that is important while it is the proportion of retail shareholding (as a proxy of the degree of agency cots)
which is important in the dividend substitution hypothesis.
We note that the main object of this paper is to investigate the importance of retail minority shareholder base in influencing dividend policy. While we hypothesise that corporate reputation serves as the device aligning managerial motivations for dividend policy with retail minority shareholder interests, an in-depth investigation into this particular relationship is not within the scope of this paper, nor is it critical to our purpose of establishing the importance of retail shareholder base as a determinant of dividend policy in Australia. Further research into the role of corporate reputation in this linkage, including the relation between corporate reputation and the degree of retail shareholder base, is left for the future.
Data Sample and Methodology
This section briefly discusses the data sources and the variables' definitions. The dividends data is obtained from Aspect Huntley and Bloomberg, and all other financial data is A number of control factors that have been observed in academic literature to influence dividend policy are included in our regression analysis. These control variables are financial leverage, size, profitability and signalling.
Financial leverage has been shown to impact dividend policy due to the debt covenants and related restrictions imposed by debtholders. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) have also pointed to the role of leverage in mitigating agency costs arising from principal-agent conflicts. We therefore include the ratio of total debt to total assets (Total debt to total assets), as a proxy for financial leverage in the regression. A negative relation between financial leverage and dividend policy is expected.
The size effect is controlled here through the inclusion of the natural logarithm of market capitalization (Market capitalisation). It is often argued that because large companies are typically well diversified businesses whose further growth opportunities are already exhausted, they are therefore more likely to pay their free cash flows out as dividends than to invest in growth opportunities. Ho (2003) hence found empirical evidence of dividend policies being positively affected by size in Australia. Smith and Watts (1992) however highlighted that the theoretical grounding for the influence of the size effect on dividend policy is not strong. In fact, studies by Allen and Michaely (1995) and Keim (1985) have observed a negative relationship between firm size and dividend payout. As such while we include size as a control variable, we do not have any particular expectation for its sign.
Profitability is also found in literature to impact dividend policy. Studies by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992) have found that a significant proportion of companies having losses over a five-year period tend to omit dividends entirely.
Jensen, Solbery and Zoun (1992) also find evidence of a positive association between return on assets and dividend payouts. We use return on assets (Return on assets) in our paper as a proxy for profitability.
Lintner (1956) observed that companies prefer to maintain stable dividends, thus creating a persistent pattern over time. This reluctance to cut dividends has been shown by Kalay (1980) to be a pre-requisite for the existence of informational content in dividends as hypothesised in various dividend signalling theories. A positive relation is therefore expected between a firm's dividend policy and its lagged value. The lagged value of the dividend measure from the previous year is hence included as a control variable. To recognise the focus on a progressive dividend policy by firm management, the lagged values of dividend policies are calculated as the dividends paid in the preceding year divided by the respective denominator in the current fiscal year.
To capture any sector or seasonality effects, we also include dummy variables for the financial sector and each fiscal year in our regression. The separation of firms into financial and non-financial is standard practice in many areas of corporate finance. This is particularly so in the study of dividend policy because dividends are perceived to be more important in the financial industry due to its purpose as one of several indicators of financial health. This split of financial versus non-financial is therefore supported by the findings of Baker, Dutta and Saadi (2008) who surveyed managers of Canadian firms and discovered that the perceptions of the factors influencing dividend policy differ between managers of financial and non-financial companies.
The separation between financial and non-financial companies is also apt for our hypothesis on corporate reputation. This is because corporate reputation is comparatively more important for service industries, particularly banks, than for other industrial sectors. Bloemer and de Ruyter The treatment of all the data follows the convention employed in Fama and French (2001) of assigning financial data to years based on the calendar year in which the fiscal year-end falls. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix between these variables. Column 1 in Table 3 shows the results of the pooled Tobit 13 regression of dividends to sales against the proportion of retail shareholder base and the control variables, while Column 1 of Table 4 shows the pooled Tobit regression of dividends to assets against the same explanatory vairables. Our findings show that as consistent with casual empiricism, the proportion of retail 12 Readers will note the large maximum dividends to sales number of 70.583 and large maximum lagged dividends to sales number of 63.599. Both these numbers relate to the company Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) whose dividends to sales numbers have been consistently high for the entire period of 2004-2008. These are caused by the company's substantial net non-operating gains which are not included in the sales figures under conventional accounting definitions but on which management had paid out dividends. When the company is excluded from the sample, the mean and maximum values of both the dividends to sales variable and the lagged dividends to sales variables falls to 6.988 and 35.335, and 5.919 and 28.402 respectively. 13 We have also performed Tobit regressions on both a winsorised data sample as well as a data sample that excludes outlier ASX, and have found both results to be very similar to the results of the Tobit regressions run on an unwinsorised data sample with no outlier-exclusions. We have therefore chosen to show the results of the Tobit regressions run on the unwinsorised data with no outlier-exclusions in this study.
Empirical Findings
shareholders on the share register of companies is a statistically significant determinant of dividend policy, with significance levels of 5% and 1% for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively.
In addition, the lagged dividend measures are also significant at 1% level for both dividend measures. The positive regression coefficients also support Lintner's sticky dividends observation. Return on assets is positively related at 1% significance levels for both dividend measures, thus highlighting the importance of profitability as a factor driving dividend policy.
Size, as represented by market capitalisation, is not significant for both dividend measures while financial leverage, represented by total debt to total assets, is negatively related as hypothesised by theory and significant at 5% level for dividends to assets but not significant for dividends to sales.
Our empirical findings therefore support a form of catering theory where managers' dividend policy decision is influenced by the proportion of retail shareholder base, with firms more likely to pay higher dividends when the proportion of retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high, even if the proportion of retail shareholdings is minor.
Robustness Checks
Alternative Control Variables
While our chosen variables of market capitalisation, return on assets and total debt to total assets are commonly accepted measures of the control factors of size, profitability and financial leverage respectively, we want to check that our empirical finding is robust to alternative definitions of the control variables. We therefore adopt different measures of these factors, and these alternative measures are: total assets (expressed as a natural logarithm), return on invested capital and long-term debt to equity 14 .
Column 2 of both Table 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions of dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base and the alternatively defined control variables. The results show that the proportion of retail shareholder base continues to be a positive determinant at 5% and 1% significance levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively. The respective lagged dividend measures and the alternative profitability measure, return on invested capital, are also significant at 1% levels and bear the expected positive signs. Size, as represented by the natural logarithm of total assets, is significant at 5% level for dividends to assets but is not significant for dividends to sales, while financial leverage as represented by long-term debt to equity is not significant for both measures of dividends.
Ownership and Control
The incentive for management to cater their dividend policy to the preferences of large shareholders is commonly highlighted in academic research (Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000;
Perez-Gonzalez, 2003). It is therefore conceivable that the influence of the large proportion of retail shareholder base is in reality exacted through the substantial combined holdings of these retail investors and that the common assumption that retail shareholders are also minority shareholders does not hold true in Australia. An examination of our data shows that for the firms in our sample, on average the percentage of retail investors as a proportion of the total number of shareholders is 88.4% while they control only a minority stake of 16.2% of the company's total shareholding ownership. While this suggests that it is unlikely that managers of these Australian companies are catering to the retail shareholders' preference for dividends because these retail shareholders are able to influence the decisions through their substantial holdings of the company, we have nevertheless chosen to test for the importance of retail shareholding as a determinant. In addition, even though we will be investigating the effects of agency costs in more depth in the next section, we want to check that the importance of the retail shareholder base is not a proxy for the dividend substitution effect arising from its minority shareholdings. We therefore replace the proportion of retail shareholder base with the percentage of the company's shareholdings that is held by those retail investors as one of the explanatory variables.
Column 3 of both Tables 3 and 4 
Agency Costs and Corporate Governance
The interaction between agency costs and dividend policy was introduced by Rozeff An alternative aspect of the agency cost theory of dividend policy is put forward by Jensen (1986) in his free cash flow theory where he suggested that managers make decisions that enhance their own interests which may not necessarily be aligned to shareholders, such as overinvesting to enlarge the size of their firms beyond the optimal points given their compensations are often related to firm sizes. The payment of dividends therefore helps to mitigate these problems by reducing the cash flow under management control.
To capture the degree of agency costs, Holder, Langrehr, and Hexter (1998) therefore adopted three measures, namely free cash flow to assets, the proportion of closely-held shares and the number of shareholders. We have chosen to test the robustness of our results by including agency costs measures as one of our explanatory variables. Indeed, the correlation of 26.1%
between the total number of shareholders and the respective proportion of retail shareholder base for the companies in our sample is positive and has a statistically significant t-statistic of 4.51.
This raises the possibility that our chosen explanatory variable of proportion of retail shareholder base is only approximating for the degree of agency costs in the company. We hence perform further robustness checks using three measures of agency costs: the free cash flow to assets, the proportion of closely-held shares and the natural logarithm of the total number of shareholders.
Column 4 of Tables 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions between the dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base, the control variables and the first agency costs measure of free cash flow to assets. The proportion of retail shareholder base is significant at 5% and 1% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively, and is positively related to both dividend measures. The respective lagged dividend measures are also significant at 1% levels for both dividend variables while total debt to total assets is significant at 10% and 5% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively. Market capitalisation is not significant for both measures. Free cash flow to assets is significant at 5% level and is positively related to dividends to sales as hypothesised by Jensen's free cash flow theory although it is not significant for dividends to assets.
Column 5 of both Table 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions between dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base, the control variables and the second measure of agency cost which is the proportion of closely-held shares. The proportion of retail shareholder base continues to be significant at 5%
and 1% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively and is positively related, while the proportion of closely held shares is not significant for both dividend measures.
Column 6 of Tables 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions between the dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base, the control variables and the third measure of agency cost which is the logarithm of the number of shareholders. The results show that the proportion of retail shareholders continue to be a significant determinant of dividend policy at 5% and 1% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively. The number of shareholders is also significant at 1% and 5% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively. While the negative relation between the number of shareholders to both dividend measures runs contrary to the expectations of Rozeff (1982) , it does provide support for the dividend outcome hypothesis of agency cost Our empirical results therefore show that the proportion of retail shareholder base is a major determinant of dividend policy even when agency cost is taken into consideration.
Franking Credits
As highlighted earlier, Hanson and Ziegler (1990) Column 7 of both Table 3 and Table 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions of dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholders, the control variables and the proportion of franked dividends. The results show that as hypothesised, under a dividend imputation system, the proportion of franked dividends paid by companies is an important determinant of dividend policy at 1% and 5% significance levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively, with the positive regression coefficient reflecting the finding of Bellamy (1994) that companies with franking credits pay higher dividends. However, the proportion of retail shareholder base continues to be an important factor influencing dividend policy, with significance level at the 1% level for both dividend measures. This highlights that the proportion of retail shareholder base is a strong determinant of dividend policy even after controlling for the amount of distributable franking credits available to companies.
Our robustness checks have therefore confirmed that our earlier finding of the proportion of retail shareholder base as a major determinant of dividend policy holds even when we employ alternative measures of the control variables, and when additional considerations such as agency cost and franking credits are included.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies. There has been traditionally been little research done on the influence of retail shareholders on dividend policy as retail investors are typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived to have limited influence on corporate decisions in most academic literature. Casual empiricism however suggests the contrary.
We hypothesise in this paper that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers' incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the incentive to manage for corporate reputation is strong when the retail shareholder base is high. Our hypothesis therefore predicts that managers of companies are influenced by the retail investors' preference for dividends in their payout decision, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of the retail shareholder base is high.
Our hypothesis is tested in the market of Australia where we find evidence of the retail minority shareholder base being an important determinant of corporate dividend policy. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and franking credits. Note: Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
